Seattle Journal for Social Justice
Volume 8
Issue 1 Fall/Winter 2009

Article 8

November 2009

Using Socio-Economics and Binary Economics to Serve the
Interests of Poor and Working People: What Critical Scholars Can
Do to Help
Robert Ashford

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sjsj

Recommended Citation
Ashford, Robert (2009) "Using Socio-Economics and Binary Economics to Serve the Interests of Poor and
Working People: What Critical Scholars Can Do to Help," Seattle Journal for Social Justice: Vol. 8: Iss. 1,
Article 8.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sjsj/vol8/iss1/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Publications and Programs at Seattle
University School of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Seattle Journal for Social Justice
by an authorized editor of Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons.

173

Using Socio-Economics and Binary Economics to
Serve the Interests of Poor and Working People:
What Critical Scholars Can Do To Help
Robert Ashford
I. INTRODUCTION
If anyone in legal education doubts whether there are a growing number
of law teachers (1) concerned about the well-being of poor and working
people in the U.S. and throughout the world, (2) opposed to practices of
subordination and other injustices, and (3) eager to do something to
improve things, let them attend a LatCrit meeting. LatCrit scholars, along
with feminist scholars and other critical scholars, have (1) raised
consciousness and sensitivity to the deep patterns and practices regarding
subordination and the abuse of power, (2) heightened normative concerns
related to legal policy and justice, and (3) taken positive steps to create an
environment where teachers with a critical perspective are more often hired,
tenured, and promoted to positions of power and authority within legal
education. Institutions, which a generation ago were a part of the problem,
have increasingly become a part of the solution. Yet, presentations,
comments, and conversations at the 2008 Thirteenth Annual LatCrit
Conference at Seattle University revealed that there is widespread
agreement among these scholars that much subordination and injustice
continue and that there is much more good work to be done.
These scholars share a widespread agreement that one of the most serious
problems that persists is that of economic injustice. Most agree that the
failure to achieve economic justice is systemically related to the distribution
of economic opportunity and economic power. And few critical scholars
disagree that economic injustice is not only an unsolved problem in itself,
but a problem that helps those with power to perpetuate other injustices.
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Finally, it is fair to say that among critical scholars, there is almost no
support for the school of thought within legal education commonly known
as law and economics1 (but more accurately called “law and neoclassical
economics”). There is considerable agreement that this approach to lawrelated economic issues, as it is commonly practiced, does not serve the
interests of poor and working people very well; and it may be viewed fairly
as an instrument of subordination (primarily because it fails to consider, or
consider fairly, the causes and effects of the highly concentrated distribution
of wealth that prevails in the U.S. and throughout the world). But beyond
this broad agreement among most of the attendants at the LatCrit XIII
Conference, there was no widespread agreement or even clear
understanding as to the causes of economic injustice, the institutions that
perpetuate it, or what critical scholars can do to beneficially address the
problem. This lack of widespread agreement and understanding regarding
economic matters is characteristic of society as a whole. When one
considers that clarity regarding economic issues and rights is of vital
importance to people everywhere, and that one of the most important duties
of lawyers and other advocates is to enable clients to identify and secure
their essential rights and responsibilities in society, such clarity should also
be of vital importance to critical scholars in legal education, practicing
lawyers, and others who advocate for poor and working people. This article
is offered to assist critical scholars to reform legal education so that
advocates for poor and working people are provided the educational
opportunity to gain greater clarity regarding law-related economic issues in
order to enable them to better serve their clients in the economic realm.
To more effectively address and remedy the problem of economic
injustice, this article argues that LatCrit scholars, feminist scholars, and
scholars of other critical schools (herein “critical scholars”) should learn,
teach, employ, and promote two important, related subjects that are
receiving increasing attention but that are still not widely understood: socioeconomics (a broad interdisciplinary approach to economics grounded in
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the scientific method and moral philosophy that draws upon all disciplines
relevant to the understanding of economic phenomena) and binary
economics (a subject within socio-economics that places great importance
on democratizing the process of capital acquisition as a means of promoting
widespread prosperity and economic justice for all people).2 By learning,
teaching, employing, and promoting the socio-economic approach to lawrelated economic issues, scholars will enhance legal education, scholarship,
service, and practice in ways that better serve the interests of poor and
working people because socio-economics places special emphasis on the
causes and effects of the distribution of economic opportunity and wealth
on economic phenomena and economic justice. By learning, teaching,
employing, and promoting binary economics, scholars will advance
understanding of an approach that will enable people to identify and secure
a very important, but little understood, economic right that is obscured by
the law and neoclassical economics approach: namely, the right to acquire
capital with the earnings of capital.
Part II of this article: provides a brief overview of law and neoclassical
economics; identifies its limitations; and, explains how its misapplication in
legal reasoning has been used to undermine the legitimate interests of poor
and working people for the benefit of those in power. Part III describes the
alternative socio-economic approach and explains how it can: supplement
the law and neoclassical economics approach with an approach both more
rigorous and favorable to the interests of poor and working people; preserve
economics’ proper application; and, prevent its abuse by recourse to sound
economic principles—principles that are widely recognized in the broader
discipline of economics but ignored by many of the advocates of law and
neoclassical economics. Part IV provides an overview of binary economics
and explains how binary economic principles can be used to empower poor
and working people in a lasting way that both distributes earning power
more broadly and promotes economic well-being for all people without
redistribution. To achieve this economic empowerment, Part IV explains
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how binary economic principles can extend the democratic, competitive
access to the institutions of finance that presently facilitate capital
acquisition with the earnings of capital primarily for well-capitalized people
to all people. These institutions include corporate finance, fiduciary law,
commercial credit, private and public insurance and reinsurance, and central
bank monetization. Part V concludes with a brief consideration of how
critical scholars can better serve the interests of poor and working people by
assisting in the growing movements: to replace the law and neoclassical
economics approach with the socio-economic approach, and to include
within teaching, scholarship, advocacy and other service, the binary
economic analysis of the dynamics of wealth distribution, wealth
maximization, and the competitive right to acquire capital with earnings of
capital.

II. LAW AND NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS
As intimated in Part I of this article, based on information provided in
numerous presentations and conversations at the 2008 Thirteenth Annual
LatCrit Conference at Seattle University, there was virtually no support for
the law and neoclassical economics approach to law-related economic
issues. There was considerable agreement that this approach to law-related
economic issues, as it is commonly practiced, does not serve the interests of
poor and working people very well; and to the contrary, the approach may
be fairly viewed as an instrument of suppression. Critical scholars view the
law and neoclassical economics approach negatively primarily because it
ignores the causes and consequences of the highly concentrated distribution
of wealth that exists in the U.S. and almost everywhere in the world.
Beyond this criticism, LatCrit participants most often criticized law and
neoclassical economics for its unrealistic foundational assumptions and its
lack of empirical rigor. Others candidly confessed that in their teaching and
scholarship, they chose to simply ignore the law and neoclassical economics
jurisprudence. And this choice to ignore law and neoclassical economics is
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also widely reflected in much critical literature. However, none of the
participants I encountered thought that either merely criticizing or simply
ignoring law and neoclassical economics would reduce the economic
injustice in society or would prevent its negative impacts on the interests of
poor and working people.
The stark reality is that formal legal education is overwhelmingly
dominated by an approach to law and economics that poorly serves the
interests of poor and working people. Because of this dominance,
generations of law students have graduated and become lawyers with either
an inaccurate, incomplete, or complete lack of understanding of many, if
not most, law-related economic issues. Thus, many lawyers with
responsibilities to assist poor and working people work with diminished
ability to do so. Reducing this harm requires (1) formulating one or more
positive alternatives to law and neoclassical economics built on a better and
more complete foundational understanding of law-related economic issues
that better serves the interests of poor and working people, and (2) winning
widespread acceptance of those alternatives within legal education. As
explained in Parts III and IV, separately and together, socio-economics and
binary economics provide such alternatives in many important law-related
contexts. As explained in Part V, critical scholars can do much to hasten the
widespread acceptance of socio-economics and binary economics so as to
better serve the interests of poor and working people.
Before proceeding further, however, it should be noted that although law
and neoclassical economics is by far the dominant approach to law and
economics within legal education (and the only approach that usually comes
to mind among legal scholars who are unfamiliar with that field), it is by no
means the only approach to law and economics found within legal
education. Other approaches include “institutional law and economics,”3
“behavioral law and economics,”4 “new institutional economics,”5 “feminist
law and economics,”6 “left-wing law and economics,”7 and a much earlier
approach to law and economics (by means limited to neoclassical
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economics) sometimes called “the first law and economics”8 and “the first
great law and economics movement.”9 Each of these approaches takes issue
with various aspects of the troublesome law and neoclassical economics
approach; and to the extent that they become better understood and
advanced more widely in legal education, each alternative approach
certainly would both (1) enhance the understanding of law-related economic
issues, and (2) better serve the interests of poor and working people.
However, these alternatives are presently largely beyond the mainstream of
the neoclassical approach that dominates teaching, scholarship, and research
in “law and economics.” It remains to be seen whether in time these
approaches, either separately or together, might grow to become a part of
the dominant approach to law and economics so as to achieve the dual goals
of rendering “law and economics” both (1) a more rigorous and lawyerly
approach to law-related economic issues, and also (2) an approach that
better serves the interests of poor and working people. Nevertheless, for
reasons explained more fully below, I believe that the socio-economic
approach (which includes all of these approaches and more) is a superior
approach to achievement of both goals.
A. Economic Theory, Neoclassical Economics, and the Neoclassical
Economic Paradigm
Although, by the plain meaning of its components, the phrase “law and
economics” used within legal education would seem to denote an academic
enterprise that incorporates the full richness of the discipline of economics
to inform and enhance legal analysis in a fair and balanced way (as good
teaching and scholarship in harmony with lawyers’ professional ethics
would seem to require), sadly this is not the case.10 This richer range of
economic theory and practice encompassed in the discipline of economics is
of course enormously important in informing one’s understanding of how
people behave economically, how economic institutions should be
structured, how the economy works, how the economy should work, and

THIRTEENTH ANNUAL LATCRIT SYMPOSIUM

Serving Poor and Working People Through Economics

how people should determine and advance their economic interests in
society. Whether derived from a formal study that leads to an advanced
degree or merely from the popular media, one’s understanding of
economics significantly influences a great deal of one’s beliefs about many
things. In the U.S., for example, it influences whether a person is a
Democrat, Republican, or Independent; a left-winger, a right-winger, or a
centrist; a liberal, conservative, moderate, or radical; a capitalist or socialist;
a believer in market solutions or government solutions to problems; and
whether one favors or opposes more taxation and redistribution. One’s
understanding of economics influences how people analyze why poverty
persists, what the requisites for equal opportunity are, and how people do
and do not achieve their highest good. It shapes people’s reactions to the
importance of autonomy and community, as well as to private and public
property. It shapes the way academics approach their teaching, scholarship,
and service in many of the social and natural sciences, in business and law,
and in many interdisciplinary endeavors, as well as the judgments of the
university administrators who set their salaries and distribute awards of
distinction and other perquisites. One’s understanding of economics
influences the agendas of many charitable institutions, most, if not all, of
the major foundations that explore “policy analysis,” and many government
agencies; therefore, it influences their willingness to fund a wide array of
university activities. It influences the editorial slant of broadcast, cable,
print, and online media, commentators, and analysis. It influences one’s
approach to Christianity, Judaism, Islam, and other faiths. When there is
disagreement in the classroom and in society, if the disagreement is not one
of religion or secular morality, chances are it is grounded in economics.
Yet, from its inception and continuing to this day, this fuller range of
economic theory and practice was and continues to be intentionally, and
perhaps strategically, omitted from the dominant law and economics
approach in favor of a concentration largely limited to neoclassical
economics.11 How this limited view of economics could ever be considered
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as an adequate, comprehensive, balanced, and an ethical, positive, and
normative foundation for informing and guiding law students, practitioners,
teachers, and scholars regarding their understanding of law-related
economic issues has never, to my knowledge, been addressed by the
advocates of law and neoclassical economics.
Because of its reliance on the assumed existence of “efficient markets,”
most neoclassical economic analysis is based on a set of simplifying
assumptions, which are used to analyze the most efficient private and public
choices regarding the allocation of resources according to various
preferences under specified conditions.12 These assumptions include the
following:
1. People behave rationally;
2. People act only in self-interest;
3. People are fully informed;
4. Prices are determined without collusion by supply and
demand;
5. All costs of production are reflected prices (i.e., there are no
“externalities”);
6. There are no transactions costs (including taxes);
7. There are no barriers to market entry or exit;
8. Income distribution is according to productivity;
9. Initial distribution of wealth preferences, skills, tastes, and
technology are exogenous (taken as externally given);
10. Factors such as race, gender, class, and nature can be
ignored or encapsulated within the market;
11. Economic decisions are made “at the margin” by evaluating
the costs and benefits of an additional unit of one alternative
compared to another (including the alternative of doing
nothing);
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12. Markets tend or gravitate toward a stable, efficient
equilibrium; and
13. The best starting point for economic analysis is one that
accepts as essentially factually accurate, or approximately
factually accurate, the existence of conditions necessary for
perfect competition, including no barriers to market entry,
perfect knowledge, and zero transactions costs.13
Based on these assumptions, neoclassical economic analysis examines
the anticipated costs and benefits that result from mutually exclusive
choices of behavior (based on individual preferences) regarding one
additional unit of any production or consumption compared to additional
unit costs and benefits of other alternatives (including the choice of doing
nothing). Neoclassical analysis then goes on to “demonstrate” that the
unfettered exercise of individual choice in the production and consumption
of goods and services will result in the optimally efficient allocation of
resources according to the preferences of market participants. Under such
conditions, promoters of law and neoclassical economics claim that societal
wealth is maximized by the efficient allocation of resources.
Neoclassical economics, with its marginal analysis, is not in itself
objectionable to the interests of poor and working people. To the contrary,
neoclassical economic analysis can be a very helpful tool when applied
properly. Indeed, included among the growing number of socio-economists
are many neoclassical economists.14 It is not the tool, but its abuse that
raises factual, normative, and legal concerns. As with any tool, neoclassical
economics can be used beneficially or abused. Nevertheless, in this analysis
of how wealth is maximized, although ostensibly every individual’s
preferences are respected, the preferences of the wealthy count much more
than the preferences of the poor. And under the assumptions set forth above,
although the unfettered exercise of individual preferences may sometimes
produce the greatest good, the determination of what is good and the
distribution of that good in most, if not all, economies is highly uneven and
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leaves the preferences of some abundantly fulfilled and the preferences of
others entirely frustrated.
However, as explained more fully below, the maximization of efficiency
is not synonymous with the maximization of wealth; and the systemic abuse
of neoclassical economics is perhaps most clearly problematic when people
(who do or should know better) advance its limited and specialized claim of
wealth maximization (under the thirteen conditions specified above) as a
pervasive conceptual framework or paradigm for achieving and
understanding the overall societal wealth maximization.15 Teaching,
scholarship, and policy analysis that wrongly equates the maximization of
efficiency with wealth maximization is a grievous error. It misuses the
efficiency analysis of neoclassical economics—a highly valuable
conceptual tool when properly applied—to support the dubious wealth
maximizing claims made by advocates of “the neoclassical economic
paradigm.” The neoclassical economic paradigm is a pervasive way of
viewing many aspects of society and institutions, including markets,
property rights, professional ethics, personal morality, and the role of
government. This paradigm’s abuse has caused great harm to education and
society in general, and to the interests of poor and working people in
particular.
Neoclassical analysis that wrongly equates the maximization of
efficiency with the maximization of wealth is particularly pronounced in
legal education under the rubric of “law and economics.”16 For reasons
suggested above and explained more fully below, this abuse of neoclassical
principles (although by no means confined to legal education) works to the
serious disadvantage of poor and working people; and the economic harm
done by this abuse cannot be avoided or undone by ignoring the
neoclassical paradigm, ridiculing its unrealistic assumptions and lack of
empirical rigor, or even by “beating those who advance it at their own
game.” What is needed to remedy the harm is one or more effective
alternative methodologies that provide sound positive and normative
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analysis of law-related economic issues that preserve the benefits of
neoclassical analysis when properly applied and enrich it with a broader and
more rigorous understanding. To this end, as will be more fully explained,
socio-economists seek “to examine the assumptions of the neoclassical
paradigm, develop a rigorous understanding of its limitations, improve upon
its application, and develop alternative, perhaps complementary, approaches
that are predictive, exemplary, and morally sound.”17
B. Problematic Foundational Propositions of Law and Neoclassical
Economics that Give Rise to the Abuse of Neoclassical Economics
One does not need a PhD in economics or even a beginner’s mastery of
its basic principles to accurately identify and challenge the misapplication
of neoclassical economics. Although complicated in its detail, the
widespread misapplication of the law and neoclassical economics approach
has, at its foundation, only a relatively few erroneous economic principles.
Some of the most important erroneous propositions are set forth below and
discussed more fully in the paragraphs that follow:
1. When efficiency is maximized, societal wealth is therefore
also maximized;
2. The maximization of efficiency has meaning independent of
the distribution of wealth;
3. The best starting point for economic analysis is one that
assumes markets are operating at or near perfect efficiency;
and
4. The maximization of total societal wealth derived from
maximizing efficiency is a distinct value to be weighed and
judged along with other values when formulating social
policy.
Each of these erroneous propositions is discussed more fully below.
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1. When Efficiency Is Maximized, Societal Wealth Is Also Maximized
As noted in Part II-A above, one problematic deficiency with the law and
neoclassical economics approach is its erroneous claim that the
maximization of efficiency is synonymous with the maximization of wealth.
This false proposition represents perhaps the most serious, but least
understood, confusion that prevails among law students, law graduates, and
the general public regarding economic theory and government policy.
Efficiency can be considered synonymous with wealth maximization only
under highly conditional circumstances that do not prevail in the real world.
This erroneous proposition carries with it great power of persuasion because
it feeds into one of the great ethics systems commonly known as
utilitarianism—an approach that roughly equates morality, goodness, and
justice with the greatest good for the greatest number. It is the widespread
confusion of efficiency maximization with wealth maximization that
provides the foundation for the frequently false wealth-maximizing claims
of the neoclassical paradigm, which then justifies tax benefits that flow
primarily to well-capitalized people and the widely accepted false
dichotomies of “wealth maximization vs. distributional justice” and
“efficiency vs. other values.”
On the strength of this false equation of efficiency and wealth
maximization, proponents of the law and neoclassical economics approach
argue that by establishing and enforcing legal rules and rights (including
market rules, liability rules, property rights, and contract rights) that
maximize microeconomic efficiency, judges, legislatures, and executive
agencies will thereby maximize societal wealth. This false claim provides
the theoretical foundation for right-wing ideology, laissez-faire policies, and
the notion that all regulation presumptively compromises or suppresses
wealth maximization by promoting a less efficient allocation of resources.
This claim is evident, for example, in the approach set forth in Judge
Posner’s book, Economic Analysis of Law.18 In advancing his neoclassical
approach to the analysis of law, Judge Posner states, “What Adam Smith
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referred to as a nation’s wealth, what this book refers to as the efficiency
ethic, and what a layman might call the size of the pie, has always been an
important social value.”19 Judge Posner compounds his error by declaring
that the connection between economic efficiency and economic growth is
uncontroversial.20
Although few American law students and law school graduates who have
had exposure to law and neoclassical economics would recognize anything
inaccurate about Judge Posner’s statement, in one crucial respect, it is dead
wrong as a matter of good economics. Judge Posner’s serious error stems
from the fact that Adam Smith’s usage of “wealth” involved his attempt to
explain scientifically how nations accumulate wealth over time and how
some nations’ economies grow larger while the economies of other nations
do not.21 Adam Smith was thus attempting to develop a theory of growth,
and his Wealth of Nations did indeed lay the foundation for modern
economics.22 For Smith, economic growth over time did indeed determine
what the common person would consider a “size of the pie.” In this respect,
Judge Posner’s statement is correct. However, Judge Posner is incorrect
when he equates Smith’s approach to wealth maximization resulting from
economic growth with his (Judge Posner’s) efficiency ethic.23 Judge Posner
confuses Smith’s classical theory of growth leading to wealth maximization
with the neoclassical theory of efficiency, which was notably advanced in
the English-speaking world by Alfred Marshall.
As a matter of positive economics, however, efficiency and growth are
quite distinct concepts. Neoclassical efficiency is not a general theory of
growth or wealth maximization, as advanced by Adam Smith. In a
shrinking, dying economy, every transaction might be neoclassically
efficient, and various conceptions of efficiency (whether as defined by
Pareto, Kaldor-Hicks, or others) could be, nevertheless, invariably
satisfied.24 In fact, neoclassical efficiency, even when positively related to
growth and wealth maximization, is only one component of a much more
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complicated dynamic process that requires a broader approach to economics
along with other disciplines to comprehend.
Since the dawn of the industrial revolution, and increasingly so ever
since, technology brings forth vast increases in productive capacity that are
not primarily the result of the gains promised by marginal efficiency. For
example, the great gains in wealth experienced in the U.S. since the 1850s
are not continuous increments driven by marginal prices with causes rooted
in constant technology and short time frames, which are the domain of
neoclassical economics. Rather, these are discontinuous, sometimes
explosively large changes in the productive capacity and the distribution of
demand with causes rooted in technological progress, capital investment,
and wealth distribution subject to limited competition, aided by selective
government allocation and protection of property rights.
Major breakthroughs in productive capacity—occasioning great increases
in wealth—are not primarily the result of efficiency gains at the margin. In
the corporate context, for example, major corporations flourish or fail in the
surplus generated long before market prices of their factor inputs and
products reach an efficient equilibrium. In this context, corporate wealth
maximization requires maximizing both normal profits (those earned in
perfectly competitive markets) and economic profits (those above normal
profits) earned in the context of substantial technological advances and
other conditions of imperfect efficiency.25
The major elements in economic growth observed in market economies
experiencing substantial growth occur when relevant markets are far from
achieving perfect efficiency and when prices are far from the theoretical
equilibrium.26 This is not to say that efficiency is not an important
consideration in wealth-maximizing analysis, but it does not play the
unambiguously positive and comprehensive role in wealth maximization
that law and neoclassical economics ascribes to it.
Thus, although there is no doubt that the immense growth evidenced by
technologically advanced countries has occurred under conditions far
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removed from the thirteen conditions set forth above which neoclassical
efficiency depends upon, the principles of neoclassical efficiency are
nevertheless widely and loosely advanced by Judge Posner and others who
pass off law and neoclassical economics as the sole theory of law and
economics and as a de facto theory of causation regarding growth and
wealth maximization.27 Such analysis confuses marginal gains with wealth
maximization and ignores the effect of the distribution of wealth,
opportunities, risks, and uncertainties that can greatly affect wealth
maximization and distribution over time in ways not comprehended by
marginal efficiency analysis.
For reasons set forth in Parts II-B-2, II-B-3, and II-B-4, this
misapplication of neoclassical economic efficiency theory is highly
prejudicial to the interests of poor and working people and has been widely
used (whether consciously or not) as an instrument of oppression by many
who formulate and implement law-related economic policy. For present
purposes, however, it is important to understand that the assumption that
maximizing efficiency necessarily or probably maximizes wealth is
factually wrong as a matter of sound economics, and should therefore be
regarded as wrong by any school of thought that operates under the label of
law and economics.
2. The Maximization of Efficiency Has Meaning Independent of the
Distribution of Wealth
Another major misrepresentation that results from passing off
neoclassical economics as the sole theory of economics is the false notion
that efficiency maximization has rigorous meaning independent of
distribution in theory and in fact.28 In other words, efficiency is dependent
on distribution. The supposed wealth-enhancing allocation of benefits in
efficient markets assumes that prices will lead to the optimal allocation of
resources, labor, production, distribution, and consumption. As a positive
matter of economics, however, the same logic that holds that prices
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determine distribution also holds that distribution determines prices. This is
a fact that receives relatively little emphasis among the advocates of law
and neoclassical economics. No standard of efficiency is, or can be, neutral
in distribution. Even when transactional costs are zero, externalities are
negligible or nonexistent, and information is perfect, the assignment of
property rights nevertheless affects prices and the allocation of resources.
The fact that efficiency is dependent on distribution belies the notion that
there is a single, determinable, wealth-maximizing standard of efficiency
(independent of distribution), which can guide either economic policy or
legal decision making. In economic theory and fact, there is no single
paramount optimal efficiency, but rather, many distribution-dependent
relative efficiencies. Thus, because efficiency is dependent on distribution,
the notion that by establishing and enforcing legal rules and rights so as to
maximize economic efficiency, or that by structuring legal rules to mimic
market participants and societal wealth will be maximized by negotiations,
judges, legislatures, and executive agencies, is wrong as a matter of sound
economics. Considerations of efficiency under the thirteen assumed
conditions set forth above do not determine how rights should be
distributed. Rather, the distribution of rights determines what distributiondependent efficiencies result under those hypothetical conditions.29
However, as commonly practiced, law and neoclassical economics
accepts without question the existing distribution of wealth, and it measures
efficiency by reference to that distribution and subsequent distributions
derived from it. As Judge Posner candidly declares:
[T]he efficiency ethic takes the existing distribution of income
and wealth and the underlying human qualities that generate that
distribution as given, and within very broad limits (what limits?) is
uncritical of the changes in that distribution that are brought about
by efficient transactions between persons unequally endowed with
the world’s tangible and intangible goods.30
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This is a wonderful approach for the rich, whose preferences have great
potency, but it is not so wonderful for poor and working people, whose
preferences count for much less. It is not surprising that there are many
well-funded centers for law and neoclassical economics at well-endowed
law schools that employ an analysis that considers distribution essentially
irrelevant for the purposes of understanding wealth maximization. In
contrast, there are relatively few centers for economic approaches that
regard distribution not only as an important normative issue, but also an
important positive issue affecting the size of the pie in addition to the size
and distribution of the slices.31
3. The Best Starting Point for Economic Analysis Is One that Assumes
Markets Are Operating At or Near Perfect Efficiency
Like neoclassical economics, on which it heavily relies, law and
neoclassical economics assumes that markets are operating at perfect or
near-perfect efficiency. Yet, according to The New Palgrave: A Dictionary
of Economics, a widely accepted economic authority, “a large volume of
work . . . suggests that [the neoclassical assumption of] perfect competition
corresponds to an extremely special, limiting case of a more general theory
of markets and that no important market fully satisfies the conditions of
perfect competition and that most would not appear even to come close.”32
The false assumption that perfect, or near-perfect, market efficiency is
the best starting point for law and economic analysis, disadvantages the
poor and working people in a number of ways. It implies that:
1. Efficiency is the primary cause of growth;
2. Prices are fair, and people wealthy enough to be owners of
productive capital enterprises are restrained by competition
from charging exorbitant prices. Employees are paid
competitive wages, and consumers are getting the most for
their money;
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3. The economy is operating with little or no unutilized capacity
(so that there is no way of improving the economic condition
of one person without redistributing from another);
4. There are no barriers to becoming a producer and that all
unemployment is voluntary;
5. All desired private-party transactions (such as those between
employer and employee and those between producer and
consumer) occur voluntarily; and,
6. Distributions of wealth different from the one generated by
the operation of the supppsedly efficient or nearly efficient
market economy will not positively affect the size of the
economic output and rather mght more likely reduce it.
Conversely, if markets are not operating at perfect or near perfect
efficiency, all of these implications are false, and the contrary implications
carry with them substantial truth. For example, when the economy is
operating with substantial unutilized capacity, (which, in the view of many
socio-economists, is almost always the unacknowledged reality), this
untapped capacity could be profitably employed (without redistribution) to
provide food, clothing, shelter, healthcare, and other necessities that poor
and working people lack.
4. Maximizing the Total Societal Wealth as a Result of Maximizing
Efficiency Is a Value to Be Weighed Separately Against Other
Competing Values
Having persuaded an alarming number of law teachers (particularly many
at the twenty-five or so top ten American law schools) that the synthesis of
the disciplines of law and economics provides a singular analysis that
properly assumes that (1) the best starting point for legal analysis is one that
counter-factually assumes market efficiency, (2) the maximization of
efficiency has meaning independent of distribution, and (3) the
maximization of efficiency is essentially synonymous with the
maximization of wealth, advocates of the law and neoclassical economics
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approach argue that efficiency is a separate value to be weighed along with
other values (when in fact any measure of efficiency is inextricably
connected with the promotion of other values). Moreover, taking the false
posture of making a concession, some advocates of law and neoclassical
economics readily agree that efficiency may be compromised by socially
acceptable (e.g., democratic) means to serve other competing values, such
as concerns for the needs of poor and working people that are not met with
the operation of the assumed efficient market.
This approach is seriously misleading because it ignores the facts that (1)
maximizing efficiency does not necessarily or even probably maximize total
societal wealth, (2) no measure of efficiency is independent of distribution,
and (3) in the real-world inefficient markets, private, individual, group,
organization, and government promotion of other values may increase total
societal wealth by altering the distribution of wealth, irrespective of
measures of efficiency. In other words, the widely accepted choice between
(1) wealth maximization (and its false proxy efficiency maximization), and
(2) other values is a false dichotomy. And the wide acceptance of this false
dichotomy proves to be seductively pernicious because (1) it falsely implies
that the pursuit of values other than efficiency compromises efficiency
(which is taken as synonymous with total societal wealth), and (2) it lulls
generations of the critics of law and neoclassical economics into fruitless,
no-win attacks on points of dispute that obscure, rather than highlight, the
critical interests and needs of poor and working people.
Some of the critics have taken up the law and neoclassical economics
invitation by explicitly or implicitly accepting their false wealthmaximizing claims and arguing that other values are more important. By
conceding the validity of the wealth-maximizing claims of efficiency
analysis of law and neoclassical economics, the critics are betraying the
interests of poor and working people, revealing exceptionally poor
lawyering skills. To those critics, advocates for poor and working people
might offer the adage given to every law student: don’t merely argue values
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if you can first defeat your opponents on the facts. And among the
economic facts that support the interests of poor and working people is the
fact that distribution is important not only normatively, but also positively.
Distributional issues concern not only how the pie is sliced and distributed,
but also what kind of pie is made, how big it is, who is employed in the
baking, and who participates in the ownership and profits of the bakery.
Other critics of law and neoclassical economics have responded by
wrongly conceding that maximizing efficiency does indeed maximize
societal wealth, and then arguing that the measurements of wealth are
inaccurate, biased, or not sufficiently inclusive. The upshot of this approach
is to struggle to improve the measurements or include additional
considerations, but to still leave poor and working people last in line after
the more privileged market participants have gotten the best of the so-called
voluntary transactions.
Another group of critics of law and neoclassical economics have
struggled mightily to beat the law and neoclassical economics proponents at
their own deceptive game by showing with extremely sophisticated analysis
that the opposite of law and economics rules actually promote more
efficiency (and presumably, therefore, more wealth creation). These
scholars sometimes (1) look at transactions costs, (2) invoke more
sophisticated approaches to efficiency analysis (such as drawing upon the
theory of second best),33 and/or (3) draw proof from behavioral psychology,
sociology, or other disciplines and considerations to prove more efficient
alternatives to laissez-faire ideology. These scholars occasionally win some
battles (at least on paper), but they are left with the false notions that
increasing neoclassical efficiency is the primary cause of economic growth
and that there are no serious positive issues raised by excluding
distributional issues from the analysis of wealth maximization. Indeed, it
sometimes seems that proponents of the law and neoclassical economics
approach will take up such “help the poor” battles to enhance the perceived
power, value, and legitimacy of the law and neoclassical economics
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approach by showing that it can be used to help the poor and working
people when its overwhelming net effect on law and economic analysis is to
betray their interests.
Virtually all of these critics, like their law and neoclassical economics
opponents, bow to the “God of Efficiency” as the sole or primary engine of
growth, when at best it is the tail wagging the dog.
To better serve the interests of poor and working people, I argue that the
more effective, more scientific, more value conscious, more ethical, more
holistic, more lawyerly approaches, and the approaches more consistent
with good economics, are the socio-economic and binary approaches, which
should replace the flawed law and neoclassical economic approach. These
approaches are discussed in Parts III and IV below.

III. SOCIO-ECONOMICS AS A MEANS OF BETTER SERVING THE
INTERESTS OF POOR AND WORKING PEOPLE
The purposes of this part are to convince readers that compared to the law
and neoclassical approach, the socio-economic approach to law-related
economic issues is a superior starting point for the legal analysis because it
provides (1) a more rigorous and lawyerly approach, and (2) an approach
that better serves the interests of poor and working people. If the socioeconomic approach can be convincingly shown to be superior to the law
and neoclassical economic approach (which is inaccurately but widely
understood and advanced in teaching and scholarship as the “law and
neoclassical approach”),and (better yet) if the socio-economic approach
eventually replaces the law and neoclassical economic approach as the
generally preferred foundational starting point for analyzing law-related
economic issues, then legal education and the interests of poor and working
people would be greatly enhanced. If such a transformation were to occur, it
would by no means eliminate neoclassical analysis from the approaches law
teachers and lawyers might use because socio-economics by no means
objects to such analysis when the proper foundation for its application is
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laid. But the neoclassical approach would thereby no longer be the
dominant foundational starting point for the analysis of law-related
economic issues. My reason for writing this article and publishing it in this
journal rests in part on my belief that critical scholars can be instrumental in
bringing about this beneficial transformation.
In urging that this transformation occur, I readily concede that legal
education would also be enhanced if the dominant approach to law and
economics adequately recognized one or more of the other minority
approaches to law and economics mentioned above, such as institutional,
behavioral, and feminist economics. Nevertheless, as explained more fully
below, as a rigorous, positive, and normative approach to law-related
economic issues, I believe that the socio-economics approach offers
advantages to legal education that the mere broadening of law and
economics does not offer.
A. Background
Although the term socio-economics has been used in many ways for over
a century, as used in this article, it has a precise meaning: by way of
overview, socio-economics is best understood as a broad, interdisciplinary
approach grounded in the scientific method and moral philosophy that
draws upon all disciplines relevant to the understanding of economic
phenomena. It was first advanced in legal education in 1996 in a petition
drafted by the author that was signed by over 120 law teachers from over
fifty American law schools to establish the Section on Socio-Economics of
the Association of American Law Schools.34 Since then it has been
explicated in a number of articles and developed and applied in several law
review symposia.35 A definitive description also appears in the
Encyclopedia of Law and Society.36
On the most general level, in addressing the interests of poor and working
people, the superiority of the socio-economic approach as a positive and
normative alternative to the law and neoclassical economics approach to
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law-related economic issues is at least three-fold. First, it corrects a number
of factual deficiencies in the law and neoclassical economics approach
(including all those identified in Part II above) that result either from the
way that approach is applied or from the fact that it is not supplemented
with other schools of thought and other disciplines necessary to achieve an
accurate understanding of law-related economic issues. Second, it properly
identifies and brings to the surface of analysis important normative issues
that the law and neoclassical economics approach, as widely practiced,
tends to neglect or obscure.37 Third, it provides a constitution and a set of
rules for fair analysis and advocacy in addressing law-related economic
issues that is in harmony with holistic legal analysis and professional
ethics.38 These points are developed more fully below.
Because socio-economics analysis proceeds with a willingness to
suspend the assumptions set forth above that are relied upon for neoclassical
analysis, it adopts an analytical starting point regarding law-related
economic issues that is more consistent with a lawyerly and scientific
approach. A hallmark of legal and scientific analysis is the willingness to
question basic assumptions rather than take them for granted and to suspend
them in favor of other, sometimes conflicting, assumptions to explore their
implications with an open mind.
However, socio-economics does more than question and suspend
underlying assumptions taken as truth by advocates of the neoclassical
paradigm. Rather, based on principles of natural and moral philosophy
relied upon by Adam Smith,39 and drawing upon all relevant disciplines,
“socio-economics is a positive and normative approach that aspires to
present a factually rigorous, holistic understanding of economic behavior
that is both paradigm-conscious and value-conscious, yet at the same time,
largely, though not entirely, paradigm- and value-neutral.” 40
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B. Positive Aspects of Socio-Economics
The positive aspects of socio-economics are grounded in the scientific
method rather than any particular discipline within the social or natural
sciences. The paradigm consciousness of socio-economics recognizes that
the determination of facts depends on systemic rules (i.e., paradigms of
analysis) for determining them.41 In socio-economics, the definitions,
assumptions, logic, and applicability of paradigms are not taken for granted
but are open to examination. It is in requiring a proper foundation before
applying a paradigm (or a rule or statute) in context that vests socioeconomics and legal decision making with a high degree of paradigmneutrality. Paradigm-neutrality reflects a willingness to examine conflicting
paradigms from a mutually agreed frame of reference. Complete paradigmneutrality would start with no foundational analytical principles except
those agreed upon by the researchers. Thus, the paradigm-neutrality of
socio-economics is subject to limitation. A commitment to logical
coherence, inductive and deductive reasoning, empirical evidence, and the
scientific method—i.e., a consideration of the extent to which particular
paradigms are (1) based on reasonable, workable, testable assumptions; (2)
internally consistent; and (3) useful in describing past events and predicting
and influencing future events—as well as paradigm- and valueconsciousness, certainly does assume a basic approach to understanding.42
Socio-economics is therefore not entirely paradigm-neutral. However, these
foundational principles are very broad and inclusive. Apart from paradigm
consciousness and value consciousness, these principles are shared by all of
the natural and social sciences, the positive realm of philosophy, as well as
the “fact” side of the legal analysis of “facts and values.”
Being largely paradigm-neutral, socio-economics does not require the
adoption of any particular school of economic thought. Whether
neoclassical economics or another school of economics, or psychology,
biology, political science, or some other expertise, or one or more of the
sometimes conflicting schools of thought within an expertise are useful, will
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depend on context. Only in limited contexts will a single discipline or
school of thought tell the whole story, and neither law nor socio-economics
is foundationally beholden to any one discipline. Thus, by virtue of its large
degree of paradigm-neutrality, socio-economics does not exclude the
positive analysis of any other discipline that might provide important
insights regarding the analysis of law-related economic issues.
Although it might be considered a new paradigm, socio-economics can
also be “understood as a principled methodology, quite consistent with legal
methodology, that is well suited to compare, critique, and employ different
paradigms in particular contexts and for particular purposes.”43 As defined,
socio-economics is therefore in harmony with legal decision making in that
it requires judgment to be based on general rules applied to particular
circumstances in relevant context by way of a process that is due. Thus, like
legal decision making, socio-economic analysis requires a proper
foundation upon which to employ a particular discipline in specific contexts
while disregarding alternative approaches that lead to different conclusions.
Moreover, because it is an interdisciplinary approach founded on the
scientific method, socio-economics is not burdened by the prejudicial
credentialism, which sometimes hinders the appreciation of important
insights that are based on analytical approaches from outside the borders of
a particular discipline. Thus, one need not be an economist to be a
socio-economist. Like a competent lawyer, the competent socio-economist
can competently rely on the expertise of other professionals. Therefore,
people from a broad spectrum of disciplines and economic persuasions can
be socio-economists. Nevertheless, in a positive sense, good socioeconomics requires “good economics,” just as it requires “good logic” and
“good science.”
Being largely paradigm and value neutral, socio-economics does not
generally require specific conclusions regarding controversies, problems, or
solutions. Therefore, socio-economists may or may not agree on the
comparison, critique, or employment of one or more paradigms within a
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particular context; but with a socio-economic foundation, the substance of
the agreements and disagreements that unite and divide them are better
understood. Thus, the socio-economic approach provides an inclusive,
intellectual foundation on which a diverse array of disciplines, and schools
of thought within disciplines, can contribute to understanding, and on which
a broad spectrum of people can beneficially participate with mutual respect
for their disparate methodologies.
C. The Normative Aspects of Socio-Economics
The foregoing discussion of the positive aspects of socio-economics
includes several references to “good” as used in a “positive” or “factual”
sense. For example, given the widely accepted “paradigm” of arithmetic,
the assertion that “two plus two equals four” is “factually,” “good
arithmetic;” whereas “two plus two equals five” is “bad arithmetic.” In a
different mathematical system, the opposite might be true. These judgments
are factual, not normative. There may or may not be something normatively
good or bad about these statements; socio-economics holds that
practitioners of its methodology should be conscious of normative aspects
of the positive paradigms they employ. Thus socio-economists do not
suggest that their approach is entirely value neutral, or “purely scientific.”
Moreover, socio-economics reflects a normative commitment to do good
research that does good: research that will make a positive difference in the
world.44 Like the good lawyer, the good socio-economist must distinguish
between the important issues and those that are less important, and devote
time and attention accordingly. But this commitment to focus on the good
and important does not require specific agreement as to what is good and
important and what research will do important good. Such considerations
are left to the individual conscience. Thus, socio-economics is said to be
both value-conscious and yet largely value neutral.45 Beyond its
commitment to the good and the important, socio-economics is valueconscious in several additional respects. It requires a recognition that values
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(1) are implicit in paradigms, (2) affect economic behavior, and (3) may
affect behavior in ways that frequently cannot be reduced to discreet
variables.46
D. Socio-Economics as it Relates to Efficiency, Wealth Distribution, and
Growth
Notwithstanding the fact that socio-economics is largely paradigm
neutral, implicit in the socio-economic approach is the proposition that the
distribution of wealth, opportunities, and risks can matter significantly both
normatively and positively in terms of efficiency and wealth maximization.
“Consequently, in many important contexts, (1) distributional
considerations must not be excluded from the positive aspects of economic
analysis, (2) distributional issues cannot be treated as purely exogenous
factors, and (3) distribution cannot be assumed to be determined by factors
of marginal productivity.”47 As in law, in socio-economics distributional
issues are inherent in the positive as well as the normative analysis.
According to the socio-economic approach, efficiency “maximization
cannot be understood entirely or even primarily in terms of marginal
efficiency analysis without reference to the socio-economic context,
including social institutions, changing technology, nature, race, class,
gender, and the distribution of wealth, power, opportunities, and risks along
with their effects over time.”48 Moreover, although agreeing with
neoclassical economics that prices affect distribution, socio-economists give
equal representation to the fact that distribution also affects prices.49
Therefore, contrary to the one-sided neoclassical approach that prevails in
much of the law- and neoclassical-economics literature and teaching, socioeconomics holds that “there is no single well-defined goal of optimal
efficiency at any point in time to guide legal decision making that is
independent of distribution.”50
More importantly, socio-economists recognize (1) that the neoclassical
approach to efficiency is not a general theory of growth and wealth
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maximization (as it is falsely advanced by many who espouse principles of
law and neoclassical economics in many educational, political, and social
contexts), and (2) that wealth maximization cannot be understood entirely
or even primarily in terms of efficiency maximization.51 The accumulating
wealth of nations (the focus of Adam Smith’s inquiry) is not synonymous
with the “efficiency” that is advanced as a proxy for wealth maximization in
the law- and neoclassical-economics literature.
E. Socio-Economics in Legal Education
Thus, socio-economics offers a specific, lawyerly, foundational approach
to rules of intellectual rigor, honesty, and fair play related to economic
issues of fact and value. Until its formulation, adoption, and growing
acceptance, such a systemic approach has been lacking within legal
education. Trenchant criticism regarding the harms and shortcomings of the
law and economic approach from critical scholars, feminists, and others
have been ably advanced and well-received, and they will find a welcome
home resting on the socio-economic foundation. But until the emergence of
socio-economics as a school of thought, within the realm of legal analysis
explicitly related to law-related economic issues, such critiques will not be
supported by a comprehensive foundation that offers not only an explicit
value-consciousness and commitment to enhancing justice grounded in
moral philosophy, but also a solid foundation of economic principles based
on the scientific method. The indispensable need for a proper foundation for
the analysis of law-related economic issues is, therefore, an essential
premise of socio-economics.
Although some of the benefits of adopting the socio-economic approach
can be derived from merely broadening the dominant school of law and
economics to include other schools of economic thought, advocates for poor
and working people (indeed for all people and institutions) need a more
rigorous and comprehensive approach. In this regard, there is an important
congruence between the socio-economic approach and good lawyering.
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Like the good socio-economists, the good lawyer is not beholden to any one
discipline or school of thought. Both methodologies are inherently inclusive
of all relevant information. In harmony with socio-economics, professional
ethics require good lawyers to draw on all relevant disciplines (both positive
and normative) when serving their clients. Addressing law-related economic
issues cannot be limited to law and economics but requires an integration of
all relevant positive and normative understanding.
Because of its broad and inclusive approach, socio-economics might be
characterized in conversations as a “big tent.” The inclusive spirit in which
this visual metaphor is offered is welcome, but in truth it is somewhat
misleading. Lawyers do not make arguments and introduce supporting
evidence under a big tent. The law requires a proper foundation; and that is
what socio-economics provides with respect to law-related economic issues.
Based on the foregoing, I submit that legal education and the interests of
poor and working people would be enhanced if the socio-economic
approach were to become as widely understood and advanced in teaching
and scholarship as the law and neoclassical approach, and (better yet) if the
socio-economic approach eventually replaces the law and neoclassical
approach as the generally preferred foundational starting point for analyzing
law-related economic issues.52
Like legal realism, critical legal studies, Critical Race Theory, feminism,
and law and economics, socio-economics is a distinct school of thought.
Unlike these other schools, which have long been recognized in books and
scholarship on jurisprudence, socio-economics is just beginning to receive
recognition in jurisprudence.53 Nevertheless, its recognition and influence
are growing. A number of scholars identified with the critical schools are
authors of books and scholarship on jurisprudence. It is my hope that they
will include socio-economics as a school of thought worthy of mention in
their books, scholarship, and teaching, as for example, Professor’s Christie
and Martin have done.54 As socio-economics becomes more widely
appreciated and accepted as an alternative approach to the analysis of law-
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related issues, the interests of poor and working people will become
progressively better served, and the goals of the LatCrit movement will be
more fully realized. Critical scholars would better serve their goals by
advancing socio-economics as the proper foundational starting point for the
analysis of law-related economic issues rather than the approach
characterized by law and neoclassical economics.55

IV. BINARY ECONOMICS AS A MEANS OF BETTER SERVING THE
INTERESTS OF POOR AND WORKING PEOPLE
One inclusive approach to economic theory that is not yet widely
understood, but that is receiving increasing attention among socioeconomists and other thoughtful scholars is binary economics.56 Like the
broader field of socio-economics, binary economics holds that distribution
affects economic outcomes both normatively and positively. From the
perspective of serving the interests of poor and working people, it is the
positive impact that distribution has on both the magnitude and composition
of economic production and consumption that most significantly
distinguishes both socio-economics and binary economics from the
neoclassical approach.
However, binary economics goes further than the more general socioeconomic approach, because it focuses on one distributional issue that is
ignored by virtually all other schools of economic thought (including the
ones noted in Part II above), namely, the distribution of capital acquisition
and ownership and its crucial relation to wealth maximization, economic
prosperity, and justice for all people. To the extent that they are concerned
with the distribution of income, the other economic approaches place
virtually their entire emphasis on the distribution of jobs, wages, education,
and welfare to assist poor and working people; whereas, binary economics
addresses the distribution of income by revealing an additional legitimate
interest of poor and working people which places great emphasis on
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enabling all people (not merely well-capitalized people) to acquire capital
with the earnings of capital.
In theory, although all people in a market economy (either individually or
via agents) are able to acquire capital with the earnings of capital, reliable
empirical data reveals that as a practical matter, the major determinant in
the ability of individuals to acquire capital with the earnings of capital is the
existing distribution of capital ownership.57 Binary economic analysis
reveals (1) that the same institutions that enable well-capitalized people to
acquire capital with the earnings of capital can be opened to all people, and
(2) as capital acquisition with the earnings of capital is increasingly made
available to poor and working people, both their individual wealth and total
societal wealth increases. With an opening of the market institutions, poor
and working people will be able to earn not only by laboring, but
increasingly by owning; and their earning capacity (enhanced by their
ownership of productive capital) will promote the profitable employment of
additional productive capacity and promote a growing economy that
benefits all people.
The institutions that would be opened more democratically to all people
are (1) the system of corporate finance, (2) the institution of fiduciary trusts,
(3) capital-credit bank lending, (4) private capital-credit insurance and
reinsurance, (5) government insurance and reinsurance, and (6) central bank
(Federal Reserve) monetization. It should be noted that all of these
institutions are presently functioning, and major corporations, fiduciaries,
lenders, insurers, and the government heavily rely upon them; and there is
no indication that this reliance will stop any time soon. In response to the
global economic recession that began in 2008, the strengthening of these
institutions was central to the government’s efforts to promote economic
recovery. However, without a binary economics understanding, these
governmental actions will simply enable people to acquire capital with the
earnings of capital roughly in proportion to their existing ownership,
thereby exacerbating the unequal distribution of wealth and leaving poor
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and working people scrambling and competing among themselves for jobs
(but generally not the best jobs) and welfare redistribution.
Before proceeding further, it should be noted that although binary
economics has found a welcome home within socio-economics, because
socio-economics is always open to new ways of understanding economic
phenomena, binary economics, nevertheless, has validity independent of
socio-economic methodology and should be of interest to all economists,
lawyers, and others concerned with matters of growth, efficiency, and
distribution, whether or not they accept the socio-economic methodology.
In an important sense, therefore, this article is in reality two articles
combined as one.
A. Basic Premises of Binary Economics58
Binary economics can be distinguished from Adam Smith’s classical
economics and other economic schools by the following related
propositions:
1. Labor and capital are equally fundamental independent or
binary factors of (or inputs to) production.
2. Technology makes capital much more productive than labor.
3. The principle of binary growth: Capital has a strong, positive,
distributive relationship to growth, such that the more
broadly capital is acquired, the more it can be profitably
employed to increase output.
As used in binary theory, capital includes land, tools, animals, machines,
structures, patents, copyrights, and other intangibles—anything capable of
being owned by another and producing wealth and therefore income.
Capital does not include what is sometimes called “financial capital,” which
binary economics analyzes as a participation in the earnings of capital (i.e.,
a property right in capital). Capital also does not include “human capital,”
which binary economics analyzes as a function of labor.
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As explained more fully below, each of these propositions runs contrary
to Adam Smith’s analysis. Although he did not use the word “technology,”
according to Smith, (1) labor is the fundamental source of production and
growth, (2) technological advances in capital make labor more productive,
and (3) the distribution of capital ownership has no fundamental, strong,
positive relationship to economic growth.
B. Binary Growth
The most important contribution of binary economics to the interests of
poor and working people is the principle of binary growth. The principle of
binary growth is a potent distributive relationship between capital
acquisition and growth.59 As a fundamental economic principle, it is unique
to binary economics.60 It is not found in any writing in the economic
literature or otherwise that is not traceable to the work of Louis Kelso, who
originated the theory. Promoting the broader understanding of the principle
of binary growth will serve the interests of poor and working people,
because it reveals a win-win strategy of how to economically empower
them. It reveals a wholly voluntary market means of enriching poor and
working people and increasing growth and economic opportunity for all
people without redistributing anything from existing owners.
This understanding reveals that major corporations in the U.S., and
around the world, have a natural interest in expanding their share ownership
in ways that will not only enrich their employees, their customers, and their
neighbors (people who live and work near their facilities), but also
substantially increases the value of their shares for existing shareholders
(both individuals and institutional investors representing employees of
private companies, governments, and others).61 It also reveals how
principles of binary economics can be used to promote ways to address past
injustices by way of reparations.62 A step-by-step description of how major
corporations could enhance their profitability by broadening their
ownership in a binary economy can be found in the reference cited below.63
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One great benefit of the binary approach is that it clearly reveals that
economic and personal empowerment derived from the ownership of
productive capital (which is not realistically achievable in an industrial
economy by most people with only labor earning power): (1) can be
achieved by enabling them to acquire capital with the earnings of capital,
and (2) this enabling empowerment of poor and working people will make
the employment of more capital and labor more profitable for everyone.
Thus, to serve the interests of poor and working people, it is not enough to
ask them to consider the size of the pie without considering who gets to
participate in the ownership of the bakery. The empowering issue of the
distribution of capital acquisition is of crucial importance to poor and
working people but is entirely obscured by the abuse of the neoclassical
paradigm.64
The logic supporting the binary property/economic paradigm indicates
that the voluntary operation of an ownership-broadening economy (which
would gradually result from opening to all people the six institutions by
which capital is presently acquired primarily with the earnings of capital)
provides not only a broader distribution of wealth and income, but also
substantially more real growth than would a traditional economy. This logic
is explained more fully by the following three propositions:
1. Because demand for capital investment is dependent on
demand for consumer goods in a future period, a voluntary
pattern of steadily broadening ownership promises more
production-based consumer demand in future years and
therefore more demand for the employment of labor and
capital in earlier years.
2. A broader distribution of capital acquisition, ownership, and
income strengthens the promise of capital to pay for itself out
of its future earnings and makes profitable the employment of
more (and increasingly more productive) capital.
3. If members of the poor and middle classes are enabled to
compete with existing owners for the acquisition of corporate
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stock representing the capital requirements of companies
worthy of prime credit, they would bring to the bargaining
table a chip not possessed by existing owners: a pent up
appetite for the necessities and simple luxuries of life that the
rich have long enjoyed from capital income. After the
acquisition debt obligations have been satisfied, the earnings
of capital acquired by members of the poor and middle class
will create more production-based consumer demand than if
that capital had been acquired by the rich. In contrast, if
acquired by the rich, most of the capital earnings would seek
investment opportunities but in the context of weaker
consumer demand.
C. Labor, Capital, Production and Growth: Conventional Productivity
Compared with Binary Productiveness
In order to understand how the principle of binary growth differs
theoretically from the foundational understanding of growth articulated by
Adam Smith—and followed by virtually all other economists since—it is
necessary to compare Smith’s understanding of the role of labor and capital
in the production of goods, services, and growth with the binary
understanding. This in turn requires a comparison of the conventional
“productivity” with binary “productiveness.”
According to Adam Smith, the primary role of capital (which implicitly
he regarded as embodying know-how or technology) is to increase labor
productivity.65 Karl Marx, Alfred Marshall (widely credited for neoclassical
economics), and J.M. Keynes did not disagree. Indeed, in his General
Theory, Keynes distilled the economy to three fundamental, independent
variables: time, money, and labor. Like Smith, Keynes treated capital as a
dependent variable.66 In binary economics, labor and capital are equally
fundamental and independent variables because both do work.67
According to the binary view of production, although labor and capital
may cooperate (just as people may cooperate) to do work, each factor does
its own work by providing its own productiveness, thereby earning its own
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income. To understand the binary approach, it is important to distinguish
between productivity (which is the ratio of the output of all factors of
production, divided by the input of one factor, usually labor) and
productiveness (a special focus of binary economics, which retrospectively
means work done and prospectively means productive capacity).
The independent productiveness of labor and capital can be illustrated by
considering any sort of work. Consider, for example, the work of sawing
boards and hauling sacks. A person can saw ten boards per hour with a
handsaw, and one hundred boards per hour with a machine saw. According
to conventional economic analysis, compared to working with the handsaw,
with the machine saw the worker can saw ten times as many boards in the
same time. Thus, the worker is said to have ten times the productivity as
compared to working with the handsaw. However, when sawing each board
with the help of the machine saw, the worker is doing much less work.
Consequently, per unit of output, the labor contribution to the production of
sawed boards has decreased. From a binary perspective, the worker is
contributing no more than ten percent of the productiveness that was
required to work with the handsaw, and the machine saw is doing
essentially all of the extra work.
The independent productiveness of capital is more clearly revealed in the
work hauling sacks: (1) a person can haul one sack, one mile, in one hour,
and is exhausted, (2) with a horse, ten sacks can be hauled four times as far
(yielding a forty-fold increase in output), and (3) with a truck, five hundred
sacks can be hauled forty times as far (yielding a twenty thousand-fold
increase in output). According to the binary perspective, the horse and truck
are doing essentially all of the extra work.68
D. The Six Powers of Capital
Based on its independent productiveness, capital has six powers
important to production, distribution, and growth which are entirely
obscured by the conventional economic paradigm.69 Capital can:
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1. Replace labor (by doing what was formerly done by labor);
2. Vastly supplement the work of labor by doing the kind of
work that humans can do;
3. Do work that labor alone can never do (e.g., automatic
elevators lift hundreds of feet in seconds, airplanes fly, fruit
trees make fruit—while all farmers can do is assist in the
process);
4. Work without labor (as in the case of washing machines,
automatic bank tellers, gasoline dispensers, vending
machines, automated factories, and fruit-bearing trees);
5. Pay for itself out of its future earnings (the basic rule of
business investment); and
6. Distribute income necessary to purchase its output.
Each of these powers, when actually reflected in production, contributes
to growth (including mere labor replacement, which produces the same
physical output, plus leisure for the owner of the capital), but only the first
power directly involves the mere substitution of capital for labor. Thus,
although many economists and policy advocates abuse the marginal
efficiency theory of neoclassical economics by advancing it as the
foundation for (or the primary component of) a general theory of wealth
maximization and growth, the capital/labor substitution process is only one
component of growth (operating after the creation of greatly increased
productive capacity). From the binary perspective, as explained in Part IVF, the wealth-enhancing contributions of market pricing and resource
allocation are severely limited so long as the distribution of capital
acquisition remains narrow.
E. The Independent Productiveness and Power of Labor and Capital
Some people object to the notion of “independent” capital productiveness
and the notion that capital has six independent powers that contribute
directly to growth in ways not caused by increasing human productivity.
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Their thinking is influenced by the almost universally shared economic
approach, articulated by Adam Smith, that the primary role of capital is to
increase labor productivity, and increasing labor productivity is the primary
cause of per capita growth. These people observe that any work done by
capital depends on antecedent or concurrent work of human beings (labor).
For example, it takes the person to lead the horse; drive the truck; fly the
airplane; invent, build, operate, and repair the machines and robots, etc. One
problem with this objection is that, in this sense, nothing is independent and
no person’s labor is independent because no person exists without the
antecedent work of others and the natural bounty that supported their
ancestors. So we might as well eliminate "independent” from the English
language because nothing is independent. There is another sense in which
the work of capital and labor is not independent, because they each have
value relative to one another, and markets exist wherein market participants
can express how they value one relative to the other. However, in this sense,
no good and no factor of production are independent of other goods and
factors in terms of their relative value. But the concept of independence
does have significance in an economic sense that is explained more fully
below.
The “independent” in “independent productiveness” merely requires
recognition that both the human and the non-human factors do work
independent of the increasing productivity of the other factor.
Mathematically, this means treating labor and capital as independent
variables. Compared to the conventional economic approach employed by
both Adam Smith and J.M. Keynes, (which treats capital as a dependent
variable and labor as the only independent), the binary approach treats
capital and labor as independent (i.e., binary) productive variables.
Thus, with the binary approach, the concept of independent
productiveness does not negate the fact that in many instances both capital
and labor are generally needed to complete specific kinds of work, or the
fact that labor is needed to conceive of, design, create, operate, maintain,
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store, and repair capital. But the work of conceiving, designing, creating,
operating, maintaining, storing, and repairing capital is not the work of the
capital conceived, designed, created, operated, maintained, stored, and
repaired. Thus, although it takes a person to lead the horse, the work of
leading is not the work of hauling. If, instead of leading a horse, the leader
led ten people each carrying one sack, who would deny the independent
work (productiveness) of each of the ten human haulers merely because
someone is leading them? Likewise, while it takes a person to operate the
handsaw and machine saw, and no boards would be sawed without the
worker, it is also true that no boards could be sawed without a saw. There is
now automated machinery that can saw a great number of boards in a
comparatively short period of time with virtually no human input.
Nor does the binary approach contradict the fact that capital and labor
have market value relative to each other (and are in this sense not
:independent just as the value everything has a relation to the value of every
other thing). However, the relative value of things depends on the
distribution of capital acquisition which can only be comprehended if
capital is treated as an independent variable, as explained in Part IV-F
below.
F. Productiveness, Prices, Values, and Efficiency
A broader distribution of capital acquisition also affects price and value.
As long as most people derive little or no income from capital acquisition,
most consumer goods will be worth the work people are willing to do to
acquire them. However, people can express value not only by the work they
do, but also by the work they let their capital do. Compared to the person
with no horse, the person who owns a horse finds many more sacks are
worth hauling; and the economy of sack hauling will grow as horse (and
truck) acquisition becomes more broadly distributed. In an economy in
which the institutions that facilitate capital acquisition with the earnings of
capital are opened more broadly, the value of goods is not limited to the
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work people are willing and able to do by way of their labor, but also
includes the work they are willing and able to let their capital do.
Moreover, the willingness of laborers to work at a given wage depends
on their competitive opportunity to acquire capital with their earnings and
then receive its full net return. Accordingly, (1) the technical relationship
used in the theory of marginal productivity that governs conventional
understanding of the relative employment of capital and labor in production,
and (2) the factor income shares derived from production are significantly
dependent on the distribution of capital acquisition with the earnings of
capital. From a conventional economic perspective—in terms of its impact
on pricing, capital/labor substitution, employment, and factor income
shares—the distribution of capital acquisition is either irrelevant or of only
minor consequence.
G. Productiveness, the Distribution of Earning Capacity, and Growth
In their book Economics Explained: Everything You Need to Know About
How the Economy Works and Where Its Going, Nobel Laureate Robert
Heilbroner and Lester Thurow (then Chair of Economics at M.I.T.), present
data from which they conclude that, between 1860 and 1980, production in
the U.S. increased 600 percent per capita.70 And the economy has grown
even more per capita since then. But were people really doing six times as
much work in 1980 as they did in 1860? Are people really doing more than
six times as much work today? Or is it capital that is doing ever more of the
work per unit of production? These are questions that poor and working
people and their advocates must ask and answer if their economic strategies
are to conform to reality.
When analyzing how production and productive capacity have grown
with advancing technology, conventional market economics interprets the
role of capital as merely facilitative; capital increases human productivity,
thereby allowing for a rise in output per unit of labor, higher wages, and the
employment of more labor.71 According to binary economics, however, in
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contributing to economic growth, capital does much more than increase the
productivity of the people who work with it; increasingly, capital is doing
more of the work. The economic imperative is generally to produce more
with more productive capital and less labor. Although technological
advance may be seen to concentrate higher productivity into fewer workers,
as a general rule the primary effect of technological advancer (per unit of
output and in the aggregate) is to make capital more productive than labor
and thereby to replace and vastly supplement the productiveness of labor
with ever greater capital productiveness.72
Moreover, because capital is independently productive, it works on both
sides of the production-consumption economic equation by providing vastly
increased (1) productive capacity and production, and (2) capacity to
distribute income and leisure. According to binary economists, in a private
property, market economy, it is the capacity of capital both to do more work
and to distribute more income and leisure which explains how broadening
capital ownership promotes greater employment of existing capacity, capital
accumulation, and growth.73 Thus, from a binary perspective, growth is
primarily the result of increasing capital productiveness and the distribution
of its ownership rather than increasing labor productivity.
From a binary perspective, the recognition that capital productiveness is
increasing relative to labor productiveness, so that capital is doing ever
more of the work and has the capacity to distribute ever more income per
capita, leads to several important insights that are important to poor and
working people.
First, as capital both replaces and vastly supplements labor to increase
economic output with relatively decreasing labor per unit of output, labor’s
relative claim on total output tends to decrease so that exclusive reliance on
increased jobs and wages is an increasingly inadequate way to earn a living.
Second, as production becomes more capital intensive, most people will
not be able to preserve and enhance their earning capacity relative to what
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an economy can produce unless they supplement their labor earning
capacity with capital earning capacity.
In light of the fact that (1) the distribution of future earning capacity is an
essential motivating ingredient for the creation of present productive
capacity, and (2) the productive power of capital produces and distributes
ever more income and leisure, indicates that the capital that buys itself for
well-capitalized people can buy itself even more profitably if all people are
included in the process of capital acquisition.
H. Choosing Which Law and Economic Theories to Teach
The essence of the adversary system is that there is always more than one
way to look at things. One might say that the growth is caused by increasing
labor productivity, by increasing capital productiveness, or by a
combination of both. One might say that the ways to address the economic
needs of poor and working people are jobs, welfare, and education; or one
might say that capital acquisition with the earnings of capital is also very
important and should not be excluded from the priorities. Which way of
understanding is more helpful to the interests of poor and working people?
Which way reveals more clearly what poor and working people need not
only to survive but to flourish? Economists Heilbroner and Thurow
marketed their book with the subtitle “Everything You Need to Know About
How the Economy Works and Where It’s Going,” and they discuss
extensively the problems of poverty and income distribution, but they make
no reference to the economic importance or consequences of the distribution
of capital acquisition with the earnings of capital.74 The same is true of all
but a handful of economists throughout the world.
The conventional productivity view suggests that the solution to the need
to earn enough to survive and raise a family is increased jobs and wages,
and, if necessary, welfare. But although the privileged and some of the
lucky may flourish, the binary view suggests that jobs, wages, and welfare
will never distribute enough income to most poor and working people
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because the purpose of technological advance is to squeeze labor out of
production, and that only the acquisition of capital can distribute the earning
capacity and the leisure that was the promise of the industrial revolution.
With the advent of increasingly productive capital, jobs are eliminated. The
promise of other jobs created by technological advance will also dry up
with yet more technological advance. In an economy characterized by
accelerating technological advance, competing for earning capacity via
labor alone is like competing with horses and trucks for hauling. The elite,
along with some of the strongest and brightest, may flourish in such an
economy, but most people will not. As production becomes ever more
capital intensive, the way in which every person participates in production
must also become capital intensive, not only by laboring, but increasingly
by acquiring capital with the earnings of capital.
So what is the solution? Promote capital investment so that the benefits
will trickle down, as the neoclassical paradigms on the right suggest? Press
for increased jobs, wages, and welfare as those on the Keynesian-left
suggest? Eliminate capitalism as Marx and others suggest? Or open to
people as practical matter the right to acquire capital with the earnings of
capital as the binary view suggests? Inasmuch as the neoclassical,
Keynesian, and socialist approaches are widely taught and discussed in
policy analysis, is there any good reason to exclude the binary alternative
from virtually all economic and legal scholarship that address issues of
economic efficiency, growth, distribution, poverty, and justice?
I. Binary Economics Reveals a Concrete Plan of Action for Poor and
Working People
The binary approach is not just an academic theory sympathetic to poor
and working people, rich in feel-good rhetoric but poor in practical
application. It reveals a concrete strategy that could be practically
employed, without redistribution, for the benefit of poor and working
people. To help promote economic recovery following the global recession
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that began in 2008, this strategy is already being applied by private
companies—with substantial aid from the government—to facilitate capital
acquisition primarily for rich people and with relatively little benefit for
poor and working people.75
The logic underlying the principle of binary growth (i.e., capitalownership distribution-based growth) can be understood and implemented
by considering the three thousand largest companies in the U.S., and then
focusing on a subset comprised of prime credit-worthy companies. Most of
these companies exhibit the frustrating essence of underutilized productive
capacity. At diminishing unit costs, they can produce much more of the
goods and services people need and want. However, the consumer earning
capacity to render more production profitable, even at diminishing unit
costs, is lacking.
As noted above, presently, almost all new capital is acquired with the
earnings of capital and much of it is acquired with borrowed money. The
ownership of this corporate wealth is highly concentrated, so that
approximately 1 percent of the people own 40–50 percent of the wealth and
10 percent own 90 percent of the wealth, leaving 90 percent of people
owning little or none. Thus, capital returns its value at a rate reflective of its
long-term (suppressed) earning capacity as it buys itself for a small minority
of the population.
If the techniques presently used to enable existing owners to acquire
capital using earnings of capital were opened competitively to all people,
then in an economy with underutilized productive capacity the demand for
capital investment would increase as its income is increasingly distributed
to would-be consumers with unsatisfied needs and wants.
To acquire capital with the earnings of capital, well-capitalized people
use (1) the pre-tax earnings of capital, (2) collateral, (3) capital acquisition
credit, (4) market and insurance mechanisms to diversify and reduce risk,
and (5) a monetary policy intended to protect private property. The same
institutions and practices that work profitably for well-capitalized people
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can also work profitably for all people. In an economy operating at less than
full capacity, if capital can competitively pay for its acquisition costs out of
its future earnings for existing owners, it can do so even more profitably if
all people are included in the acquisition process.
Accordingly, to enable all people and major, prime, credit corporations to
capitalize on the potent distributive relationship between voluntary
ownership-broadening capital acquisition and growth, a binary economy
requires only modest reforms to open the market infrastructure governing
corporate finance so that everyone is vested with competitive capital
acquisition rights to acquire capital with the earnings of capital.
As shown in the General Theory Diagram below, structure of a binary
economy can be modeled with six basic institutions: (1) Prime CreditWorthy Corporations, (2) Capital Ownership-Broadening Trusts, (3) Banks,
(4) Private Capital Credit Insurers, (5) the Capital Diffusion Reinsurance
Corporation (the only new entity, modeled after the Federal Housing
Administration), and (6) the Central Bank (Federal Reserve).
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Figure 1: General Theory Diagram

In a binary economy, in addition to their usual means of acquiring capital
assets (borrowing, retained earnings, and sale of shares), prime creditworthy corporations could raise the funds to acquire capital assets by selling
special full-dividend common shares to a capital ownership-broadening
trust for the benefit of employees, customers, neighbors, and others, paid for
with a bank loan to the trust, insured by a private capital credit-insurer and
government reinsurer, and discounted at a rate of 99.75 percent by the
Federal Reserve (with 0.25 percent reflecting its estimated administrative
cost). Once the capital acquisition loan repayment obligations are met, the
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full net capital earnings (net of reserves for depreciation, research, and
development) would be paid to the binary owners to help them meet their
needs and wants and to provide the basis for increased investment,
employment, and production.76
According to binary theory, the more broadly capital is acquired in
voluntary market transactions, the faster an economy, and large
corporations within that economy, will grow. More broadly distributed
capital acquisition will:
1. Distribute more consumer demand, thereby enhancing the
market for goods and services;
2. Profitably employ more underutilized capacity (both capital
and labor);
3. Increase capital investment;
4. Accelerate technological advance;
5. Provide additional financial capital for entrepreneurial
enterprises;
6. Enhance employee productivity, consumer loyalty, and
general goodwill among neighbors of participating
companies and the general population;
7. Reduce the need for taxation, other forms of redistribution,
and associated transactions costs;
8. Enhance general wealth of most major corporations, their
shareholders, and the general population;
9. Broaden, deepen, and more fully democratize the institution
of private property by opening its benefits to more people;
and
10. Strengthen political democracy by opening capital
acquisition with the earnings of capital to more people.77
Although government assistance to private companies, banks, capital
credit insurers (such as AIG), and quasi-public capital credit insurers (such

VOLUME 8 • ISSUE 1 • 2009

219

220 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac), and generous federal reserve
monetization to extend competitive capital acquisition rights more broadly
to include poor and working people may be seen as politically impractical,
it is essentially what is now being done for the capital acquisition rights of
richer people. The most significant difference is that poor and working
people are being unnecessarily excluded; and tragically, they and most of
their advocates do not understand that their exclusion is thwarting economic
recovery and that their inclusion would aid it.
Unfortunately, at present, the vast majority of lawyers, law teachers, and
law students committed to the interests of poor and working people seem
wholly unaware that the right to acquire capital with the earnings of capital
might be the subject of advocacy. Although the concepts underlying binary
economics were first published over fifty years ago, generations of students
of law, economics, and other relevant disciplines continue to graduate with
no exposure to those concepts. Reform of the curriculum in law, economics,
and other disciplines within colleges, universities, business schools, and law
schools is therefore a matter of urgent concern. Critical scholars could do a
great deal to correct this deficiency in education.

V. LEARNING, TEACHING, EMPLOYING AND PROMOTING SOCIOECONOMICS AND BINARY ECONOMICS
So, what can LatCrit scholars who are seriously committed to the welfare
of poor and working people do to assist them in achieving greater economic
understanding and empowerment? One answer is to learn, teach, employ,
and promote socio-economics and binary economics.
By learning, teaching, employing, and promoting the principles of socioeconomics as a foundationally holistic, value-conscious, factually accurate
method of analyzing law-related economic issues and by teaching it to
others and promoting its acceptance ever more broadly in legal education,
LatCrit scholars can better serve the interests of poor and working people
by hastening the time when socio-economics entirely supplants the
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prevailing law and neoclassical economics approach to such issues. As
noted above, the widespread acceptance of the socio-economic approach
will not eliminate the useful application of neoclassical economics when the
proper foundation is laid for its application, but it will prevent its
application in contexts where it should not be applied. The widespread
acceptance of the socio-economic approach will also facilitate the proper
application of other schools of economics and other disciplines as necessary
to competently represent clients.
By learning, teaching, employing, and promoting the broader acceptance
of binary economics among legal educations, LatCrit scholars can better
serve the interests of poor and working people by helping them and their
advocates to identify and secure a crucial property right that they need to
flourish in a market economy. Promoting their widespread understanding
of binary economics will hasten the time when the institutions of corporate
finance, banking, insurance, government loans and guaranties, and
monetary policy (the very institutions presently relied upon by wellcapitalized people to acquire capital with the earnings of capital) can be
practically opened to poor and working people. With that opening, the right
to acquire capital with the earnings of capital can be more broadly extended
to them and a more level and competitive economic playing field can be
established, and the prospects for greater and more broadly distributed
earning capacity, prosperity, and leisure can be reasonably expected and
realized by all.
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